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The Weatherization Assistance Program shows that successful
state implementation of federal policies depends on preexisting
state regulations
The US system of government means that the states have to implement federal policies at the
local level. In new research which uses the federal Weatherization Assistance Program as a case
study, Jessica Terman looks at the influence of preexisting state regulatory environments on the
implementation of federal programs. She finds that although state and federal programs can have
similar goals, in practice, they may impede the performance of one another. 
In an era of grassroots politics, there is a certain appeal to having federal policies implemented
by lower levels of government. States and localities are well placed to tailor federal programs to
the preferences and needs of their residents. One need only look to President Obama’s Affordable Care Act as an
example of the tension between far-reaching federal programs and individualized state preferences. As such,
many governments in federalist systems have handed off their implementation responsibilities to lower levels.
Previous research has explored the choices that states make with federal dollars in terms of resource allocation
across different policy areas. However, there is very little research on how preexisting state policy environments
influence the actual implementation performance of federally funded, state implemented programs. Using the
federally funded, state implemented Weatherization Assistance Program (WAP), I investigate the relationship
between preexisting state regulatory environments and federal program performance.
The Weatherization Assistance Program 
The WAP is a United States Department of Energy program that provides energy audits and retrofits to low
income populations. Program performance is measured by achievement of a predetermined number of
weatherizations in each WAP service area. Multiple service areas are nested within each state. Figure 1 shows
the proportion of planned weatherizations that were completed in each service area. Values under one indicate
that service areas did not achieve their weatherization goals while values over one indicate that service areas
exceeded their goals. On average, WAP service areas exceeded their weatherization goals by 33 percent.
However, there is considerable variation in this goal achievement across service areas. Some service areas did
not fulfill any of their weatherization goals, while at least one exceeded their goal by 600 percent. The results of
my research suggest that at least some of this variance in WAP performance is to the state energy efficiency
regulatory environments within which federal programs are implemented.
Figure 1 – Weatherizations planned that were completed  
Preexisting state regulatory environments in energy efficiency 
State regulations, such as building standards or utility performance incentives, are energy efficiency policy tools.
They can build state implementation capabilities and capacity in ways that facilitate or impede the implementation
and performance of federal programs. Among a number of state energy efficiency regulatory policies, I theorize
that state spending on gas/electric energy efficiency programs facilitates WAP performance by developing the
internal infrastructure to get consumers to voluntarily change their behavior because they focus on getting
consumers to directly reduce their energy use through incentives offered by public agencies. One example of this
facilitation is California’s program that requires municipal utilities to offer solar incentives to ratepayers – the total
municipal investment is upwards of $784 million.
On the other hand, state programs may impede federal program performance by preempting federal program
goals. This preemption can result from state programs whose purpose overlaps substantially with federal
programs or from the outsourcing of state resources, which starves states of necessary implementation
resources. In the context of energy efficiency, two policy tools that impede federal program goal achievement
include: (1) heightened building energy codes and (2) regulatory decoupling. While seemingly effective policies on
their own, state building energy codes have the potential of impeding WAP goal achievement because it will
become more difficult to find residences that require weatherization. This is because residences in states with
heightened building codes will to be sounder in terms of weatherization (i.e. more sophisticated caulking, etc.). In
other words, building codes may preempt weatherization and achievement of WAP performance goals.
Decoupling is the policy of separating utility revenues from energy consumption in order to incentivize utility
companies to offer consumers programs to reduce their energy usage. Decoupling is important to energy
efficiency because electricity and natural gas consumption have generally been linked directly to energy costs;
therefore, a reduction in consumption results in a decrease in revenues and profits for utility companies. When
states disassociate consumption from revenues, the goal is to get utility companies to offer their own programs to
reduce energy consumption.
However, the result of this decoupling is that states rely on utilities to provide energy efficiency and conservation
programs to reduce the consumption of energy users. As such, states outsource their ability to provide programs
that reduce consumption and promote energy efficiency, therefore reducing their capability to directly implement
programs such as the WAP.
Facilitating and Impeding Federal Program Performance  
Of the state programs that were tested in the analysis, state per capita spending on electric and gas efficiency
programs had a positive effect on federal program performance in the WAP. On average, the proportion of
weatherizations planned that were completed by a given state increases by 2 percent with a one unit change in
public spending on electricity and gas energy efficiency programs. The nature of this spending is such that it
reinforces public involvement and focus on energy efficiency and conservation programs. This is a particularly
interesting finding when contrasted with the other state regulations in the context of energy efficiency.
The results of this study also support my theory on impeding regulatory state policies. States that had heightened
IECC building codes and heightened levels of decoupling actually exhibited worse program performance. The
average proportion of weatherizations planned that were completed by a given state decreases by 9 percent with
every one unit change in a state’s decoupling score. The average proportion of weatherizations planned that were
completed by a given state decreases by roughly 11 percent with a one-unit increase in a given state’s residential
building code score. Thus, although state and federal programs can have similar goals, in practice, they may
impede the performance of one another. The nature of this spending is such that it reinforces public involvement
and focus on energy efficiency and conservation programs.
The results described above provide a more nuanced understanding of local implementation of federal programs.
On their own, state regulations may be effective mechanisms for enhancing energy efficiency; however, the
imprint that they leave on the state’s capacity and infrastructure may actually impede federal goal achievement in
WAP. This should give policymakers at both the state and federal level pause in terms of how they allocate state
resources. The next step in this research is determining the appropriate threshold and resource allocation for
successful implementation of federal programs. With additional information on how state and federal policies
compliment (or conflict with) one another, federal resources can be allocated with more fruitful program results.
This article is based on the paper, ‘Performance Goal Achievement in Fiscal Federalism: The Influence of State
Partisan Environments and Regulatory Regimes’, in the Policy Studies Journal.
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